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Falsification in Math vs Science



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5















In the beginning it was thought that the statement 1+1=0 is false, and necessarily so.
However, with the birth of modular arithmetic, it was found that indeed, 1+1 does indeed equal to 0 (in the mod 2 setting).



Now in the sciences for example physics, it's understood that Newtonian mechanics has in a sense been falsified, in the sense that, while it remains correct in its regime of validity, there are other regimes in which it is not correct.



However, while most people would say that in the second case, we have Newtonian mechanics being falsified, we do not consider 1+1=2 to have been falsified (in its own regime of validity). Why is that?










share|improve this question


















  • 31





    1+1=2 is still true in the mod 2 setting. It just so happens that 2 and 0 are names for the same object in this setting.

    – Dan Staley
    yesterday






  • 2





    Newtonian mechanics is not considered to be falsified by any working physicist that I know. Where did you get that? Or do you think QM or GR falsified it? Neither is true. It is indeed possible that GR is falsified in the future, like if there is a dilaton after all. And in a sense the original version has already been falsified with the addition of a cosmological term of the opposite sign to one that Einstein considered and rejected. QM definitely does not falsify Newtonian mechanics. QM is built on the same foundation, and for sure F=ma is still true in QM.

    – Kostas
    14 hours ago













  • Besides, as some other people pointed out already, 1+1=2 is still true in modular arithmetic. So, not need to doubt well established facts of science, progress comes not from doubt of old things, but from invention of new things.

    – Kostas
    14 hours ago


















5















In the beginning it was thought that the statement 1+1=0 is false, and necessarily so.
However, with the birth of modular arithmetic, it was found that indeed, 1+1 does indeed equal to 0 (in the mod 2 setting).



Now in the sciences for example physics, it's understood that Newtonian mechanics has in a sense been falsified, in the sense that, while it remains correct in its regime of validity, there are other regimes in which it is not correct.



However, while most people would say that in the second case, we have Newtonian mechanics being falsified, we do not consider 1+1=2 to have been falsified (in its own regime of validity). Why is that?










share|improve this question


















  • 31





    1+1=2 is still true in the mod 2 setting. It just so happens that 2 and 0 are names for the same object in this setting.

    – Dan Staley
    yesterday






  • 2





    Newtonian mechanics is not considered to be falsified by any working physicist that I know. Where did you get that? Or do you think QM or GR falsified it? Neither is true. It is indeed possible that GR is falsified in the future, like if there is a dilaton after all. And in a sense the original version has already been falsified with the addition of a cosmological term of the opposite sign to one that Einstein considered and rejected. QM definitely does not falsify Newtonian mechanics. QM is built on the same foundation, and for sure F=ma is still true in QM.

    – Kostas
    14 hours ago













  • Besides, as some other people pointed out already, 1+1=2 is still true in modular arithmetic. So, not need to doubt well established facts of science, progress comes not from doubt of old things, but from invention of new things.

    – Kostas
    14 hours ago
















5












5








5


3






In the beginning it was thought that the statement 1+1=0 is false, and necessarily so.
However, with the birth of modular arithmetic, it was found that indeed, 1+1 does indeed equal to 0 (in the mod 2 setting).



Now in the sciences for example physics, it's understood that Newtonian mechanics has in a sense been falsified, in the sense that, while it remains correct in its regime of validity, there are other regimes in which it is not correct.



However, while most people would say that in the second case, we have Newtonian mechanics being falsified, we do not consider 1+1=2 to have been falsified (in its own regime of validity). Why is that?










share|improve this question














In the beginning it was thought that the statement 1+1=0 is false, and necessarily so.
However, with the birth of modular arithmetic, it was found that indeed, 1+1 does indeed equal to 0 (in the mod 2 setting).



Now in the sciences for example physics, it's understood that Newtonian mechanics has in a sense been falsified, in the sense that, while it remains correct in its regime of validity, there are other regimes in which it is not correct.



However, while most people would say that in the second case, we have Newtonian mechanics being falsified, we do not consider 1+1=2 to have been falsified (in its own regime of validity). Why is that?







philosophy-of-science philosophy-of-mathematics falsifiability






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asked yesterday









K9LucarioK9Lucario

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  • 31





    1+1=2 is still true in the mod 2 setting. It just so happens that 2 and 0 are names for the same object in this setting.

    – Dan Staley
    yesterday






  • 2





    Newtonian mechanics is not considered to be falsified by any working physicist that I know. Where did you get that? Or do you think QM or GR falsified it? Neither is true. It is indeed possible that GR is falsified in the future, like if there is a dilaton after all. And in a sense the original version has already been falsified with the addition of a cosmological term of the opposite sign to one that Einstein considered and rejected. QM definitely does not falsify Newtonian mechanics. QM is built on the same foundation, and for sure F=ma is still true in QM.

    – Kostas
    14 hours ago













  • Besides, as some other people pointed out already, 1+1=2 is still true in modular arithmetic. So, not need to doubt well established facts of science, progress comes not from doubt of old things, but from invention of new things.

    – Kostas
    14 hours ago
















  • 31





    1+1=2 is still true in the mod 2 setting. It just so happens that 2 and 0 are names for the same object in this setting.

    – Dan Staley
    yesterday






  • 2





    Newtonian mechanics is not considered to be falsified by any working physicist that I know. Where did you get that? Or do you think QM or GR falsified it? Neither is true. It is indeed possible that GR is falsified in the future, like if there is a dilaton after all. And in a sense the original version has already been falsified with the addition of a cosmological term of the opposite sign to one that Einstein considered and rejected. QM definitely does not falsify Newtonian mechanics. QM is built on the same foundation, and for sure F=ma is still true in QM.

    – Kostas
    14 hours ago













  • Besides, as some other people pointed out already, 1+1=2 is still true in modular arithmetic. So, not need to doubt well established facts of science, progress comes not from doubt of old things, but from invention of new things.

    – Kostas
    14 hours ago










31




31





1+1=2 is still true in the mod 2 setting. It just so happens that 2 and 0 are names for the same object in this setting.

– Dan Staley
yesterday





1+1=2 is still true in the mod 2 setting. It just so happens that 2 and 0 are names for the same object in this setting.

– Dan Staley
yesterday




2




2





Newtonian mechanics is not considered to be falsified by any working physicist that I know. Where did you get that? Or do you think QM or GR falsified it? Neither is true. It is indeed possible that GR is falsified in the future, like if there is a dilaton after all. And in a sense the original version has already been falsified with the addition of a cosmological term of the opposite sign to one that Einstein considered and rejected. QM definitely does not falsify Newtonian mechanics. QM is built on the same foundation, and for sure F=ma is still true in QM.

– Kostas
14 hours ago







Newtonian mechanics is not considered to be falsified by any working physicist that I know. Where did you get that? Or do you think QM or GR falsified it? Neither is true. It is indeed possible that GR is falsified in the future, like if there is a dilaton after all. And in a sense the original version has already been falsified with the addition of a cosmological term of the opposite sign to one that Einstein considered and rejected. QM definitely does not falsify Newtonian mechanics. QM is built on the same foundation, and for sure F=ma is still true in QM.

– Kostas
14 hours ago















Besides, as some other people pointed out already, 1+1=2 is still true in modular arithmetic. So, not need to doubt well established facts of science, progress comes not from doubt of old things, but from invention of new things.

– Kostas
14 hours ago







Besides, as some other people pointed out already, 1+1=2 is still true in modular arithmetic. So, not need to doubt well established facts of science, progress comes not from doubt of old things, but from invention of new things.

– Kostas
14 hours ago












5 Answers
5






active

oldest

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29














In math, we define stuff like numbers and operators, then we go on to prove other stuff from those premises.



When you ask: "Is 1 + 1 = 0?", a mathematician will just ask back: "With what definition of +?"




  • If you assume natural numbers and the common definition of +, then this statement is false.


  • If you assume numbers modulo 2 and + meaning XOR, then this statement is perfectly true.



You cannot say that we falsified the claim that 1 + 1 = 2; we just came up with new definitions for what + could mean.





For physics, the situation is a little different: Here we measure stuff we want to explain, then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements, and finally, we test the theory by measuring more stuff, trying to falsify our theory.



In the example you gave, Newton had some measurements (like falling apples) that he wanted to explain, so he came up with his theory of force, acceleration and movement, and he could explain his measurements. We continued testing his theory until finally the Michelson-Morley Experiment produced numbers that could not be explained with Newtonian Physics anymore. So, Einstein came up with a new theory that could explain all that the old theory could explain, and which also explained the result of the Michelson-Morley Experiment.



Note that I said "could explain all that the old theory could explain". Newton's theory worked fine for small numbers, and Einstein's theory had to make the same predictions for these small numbers. More precisely, Newton's theory is nothing more or less than a convenient approximation of Einstein's theory for small numbers.



We do this a lot in physics: We know that some stuff obeys some complex rules, but we don't want to bother with deriving mathematically correct results, so we just use an approximation (and hopefully check that this approximation is indeed not too far off). The point is, in the end physicists can only falsify stuff by measurement which includes measurement errors, and it does not help our cause to calculate stuff we can't measure. But the approximations allow us to make conclusions we cannot derive with mathematical rigor.



So, a physicist with a quartz-clock, a ruler, and a scale will simply use Newtonian Mechanics to predict their measurements. A physicist listening in to gravitational waves does not have this luxury, they must use General Relativity to derive their predictions. The first physicist simply uses an approximation (Newtonian Mechanics) to an approximation (Special Relativity) to a theory (General Relativity) which we do not know what theory it approximates yet (String Theory? Loop Quantum Gravity? Something else?)



In this sense, no physical theory is fully correct or incorrect. For some theories we know where they start producing numbers that actually disagree with our experiments, and for others we may not have discovered those places yet. But that does not reduce their usefulness when we apply them to problems where we know that they yield sufficiently precise results. In the end, any physical theory is just an approximation of reality.






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cmaster is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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  • 3





    I'm not sure if the statement "any physical theory is just an approximation of reality" is necessarily always true. After all, we could inadvertently stumble upon a physical theory that exactly describes reality; there's nothing preventing us from doing that. However, we couldn't ever verify that it exactly described reality, as it can only ever be verified to within a finite experimental uncertainty. Other than that admittedly quite pedantic clarification, great answer!

    – probably_someone
    yesterday













  • @probably_someone No, it's not physics then - the recipe that "exactly describes reality" is a beast that would be incompatible with the existing processes/customs of physics and very much compatible with those of mathematics. So it would be basically mathematics for all intents and purposes and we would dismantle all the LHCs and JWSTs of this world. (Such recipe is simply a set of axioms and all the further work is exploring the implications in this or that scenario.)

    – kubanczyk
    16 hours ago








  • 1





    @cmaster When you say "then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements" it isn't very easy to understand, I prefer to put it in other words: some fancy theory that predicts other future measurements.

    – kubanczyk
    16 hours ago











  • @probably_someone Full ACK on that nitpick :-) I left that bit out because I didn't want to unnecessarily complicate the answer. Since we cannot know the difference between an approximating theory and that lucky find of the true theory, I don't think it makes a difference not to mention it in the answer. But I do hope that curious readers read your comment.

    – cmaster
    15 hours ago











  • @kubanczyk I formulated it this way because the theorist whipping up a new theory only ever knows the past measurements, and can only weave the theory in a way that makes it fit those past measurements. Of course, they hope that their theory will indeed make correct predictions, but the deriving of measurable predictions really only comes after the theory has been formulated, and success of the predictions is not guaranteed. Of course, there is also the observation that a theory that does not make falsifiable predictions is rather worthless, yet it would still be a theory for what we know.

    – cmaster
    15 hours ago



















9














The hypothesis 1+1=0 is false in the domain of natural numbers. If the domain is the finite field of the integers mod 2, then one is no longer in the domain of the natural numbers and the statement 1+1=0 would be true in that domain.



The question is why do we not consider these to be falsifications of each other?



These are not contradictions or falsifications if we view these statements in their separate domains. The domain of the natural numbers is not the domain of the integers mod 2. Although the statements may look the same, they are statements derived or not from different domains and so are different.





Falsification would be involved in mathematics by assuming something with the intent to arrive at a contradiction. If one can arrive at the contradiction, then one can conclude that what one assumed true was false. One name for this inference rule would be proof by contradiction.



Wikipedia describes it as follows:




In logic, proof by contradiction is a form of proof that establishes the truth or validity of a proposition by first assuming that the opposite proposition is true, and then shows that such an assumption leads to a contradiction. Proof by contradiction is also known as indirect proof, proof by assuming the opposite, and reductio ad impossibile.






Wikipedia contributors. (2019, March 26). Proof by contradiction. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 16:55, April 9, 2019, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Proof_by_contradiction&oldid=889548940






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  • But then why is Newtonian mechanics viewed as being falsified? There too, it is correct in its own domain. Why should we view this as a falsification while in the 1+1=0 it is not?

    – K9Lucario
    yesterday






  • 4





    @K9Lucario Restricted to certain problems in the domain of bodies in motion, Newtonian mechanics is still useful for making predictions. Current gravity theories explain more of the data obtained from the same domain of bodies in motion. So these theories are talking about the same domain.

    – Frank Hubeny
    yesterday






  • 14





    I think you might want to stress a particular facet of your answer - 1+1=0 in the domain of the naturals vs F_2 is not the same statement. Sure, it looks the same when we write it in our convenient notation, but if you were to logically express both statements from the "ground up" you would find they are simply different.

    – TreFox
    yesterday






  • 1





    @TreFox I agree. They are not the same statements because the domains are different. They look the same, because sometimes our conventions for symbolizing natural numbers and equivalence classes look the same. However, we could use a different notation for each domain to emphasize their differences.

    – Frank Hubeny
    yesterday






  • 2





    @K9Lucario the domain of science is the real world. In math, we may choose the axiom set arbitrarily. We don't have such luxury in real life.

    – IMil
    23 hours ago



















4














1 + 1 = 0 is false.



Meanwhile, (1_2) +_2 (1_2) = 0_2 is true. Here +_2 is a different operation than +, and 1_2 and 0_2 are different things than 1 and 0. So it's not surprising that one equation is true while the other is false.



The problem is that we do not like to write "_2" everywhere, so we often write 1 + 1 = 0 when we mean 1_2 +_2 1_2 = 0_2. This can possibly lead to confusion, though hopefully the author (or context) will make it clear what is meant by the equation 1 + 1 = 0, whenever it is written, so that ambiguity is avoided.



I would not say that Newtonian physics is "false", but I would say that it does not accurately predict certain observations we make about our universe, while Einstein's Relativity does seem to predict these observations quite well. So Newtonian physics is apparently not the best theory for our physical universe.



However, since there are no other universes(?), physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience.






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  • "physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience." Lol I love that diffidence! Some theorists believe that an infinite number of universes (a multiverse) exist, which don’t connect to each other. I find that quite amusing; how could that issue matter to me? Even a single universe (and a pluralistic metaphysics) is too much for anybody to understand very well – I don’t think that we have any business in other hypothetical ones!

    – Rortian
    yesterday













  • @Rortian : One model of multiverses makes them materially inaccessible, but gravitationally interacting. So while you can't touch anything in that other universe or see any light from things in that universe, you may still feel the force of gravity from things in that universe. A weak version of this is dark flow, peculiar galactic motion caused by masses which have moved beyond the horizon of the observable universe (see cosmological horizon).

    – Eric Towers
    16 hours ago













  • Well, @Eric Towers...theoretical physics is rather fascinating, but how relevant is it to people who aren't working at it? I don't mean that it doesn't inspire the production of engineering marvels like bombs, computer chips and spacecraft, but it doesn't inspire me to think about the things that matter most to me and to the people I associate with...

    – Rortian
    4 hours ago








  • 1





    @Rortian : My comment was a reply to your "how could that issue matter to me?" Your comment seems based on the (not necessarily true) belief that these other universes have no mechanism of action on you. I pointed out two theories of inaccessible alternate universes that do act on you.

    – Eric Towers
    3 hours ago



















2














Your example from mathematics shows: To assess a mathematical statement one should first fix the context, the domain of validity of the symbols. Because in the context of natural numbers the statement 1+1=0 is false. While in the context of Z/2Z the statement is correct. Except the rare case of undecidable questions, in mathematics one can prove or disprove the correctness of a statement.



In natural science, e.g. in physics, one can never prove a general statement. All „laws of nature“ have the status of hypotheses. One can confirm a hypothesis or one can disprove the hypothesis by a counter example. But one cannot prove it.



IMO Newton’s laws are a good approximation in a broad domain, i.e. for small energy and medium dimension. One can deduce Newton’s laws as first order approximation from the field equations of General Relativity. But anyhow, Newton’s basic concepts like space, time and gravitation have quite a different meaning in Einstein’s theory of curved spacetime.



To say that a statement turns out as a first approximation is a refined and better version than saying that the statement is false. I prefer the refined version :-)






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    1














    Hmmm. What about 1 + 1 = 10 ?



    Is that equation, expressed in binary arithmetic, "false in the domain of natural numbers"?



    My grounding in math and logic isn't very strong, but I understand the Wikipedia entry...I just don't think that the notions of truth and falsity can coherently apply to inductive inferences (abstract descriptions of unobservable things).



    I've also heard people (philosophy professors!) say that Einstein disproved Newton's stuff, but that seems incorrect to me in the postmodern age of philosophy. Newton wasn't mistaken, his principles describe his observations very well. His theoretical model wasn't poor or wrong, and scientific proof seems to me to be an oxymoron. People who have faith in that idea reject the notion of fallibilism, which is commensurate with the postmodern approach:




    Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory,
    view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified
    in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the
    truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to
    science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved
    commonsense views.




    Stephen Hetherington, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy



    I've learned (is this correct?) that true/false distinctions are properties of formal languages ( arithmetic and logic), where axioms and operations are strictly defined and the symbols are unrelated to observable phenomena (only to each other).



    As for discourses in natural languages, the idea of epistemic truth (especially the theory of correspondence to reality) has been quite thoroughly discredited...or so I've been told...



    I'm new here; I wouldn't be happy to hear that I (and my wisest philosophy instructors) have misinterpreted Kant, Kuhn and Popper, but if a wise expert disagrees I'll listen. I believe that it's theoretically impossible to denote the absolute truth about unobservable phenomena or complex abstractions, but I'm still learning...



    In any case, to me coherency is the gold standard of human understanding, not truth. Subjective beliefs and public discourses may be assessed according to so-called objective criteria: the reliability of relevant evidence and the justification for one's presumptions. I think that that's one thing upon which scientists and philosophers might agree.






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      5 Answers
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      In math, we define stuff like numbers and operators, then we go on to prove other stuff from those premises.



      When you ask: "Is 1 + 1 = 0?", a mathematician will just ask back: "With what definition of +?"




      • If you assume natural numbers and the common definition of +, then this statement is false.


      • If you assume numbers modulo 2 and + meaning XOR, then this statement is perfectly true.



      You cannot say that we falsified the claim that 1 + 1 = 2; we just came up with new definitions for what + could mean.





      For physics, the situation is a little different: Here we measure stuff we want to explain, then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements, and finally, we test the theory by measuring more stuff, trying to falsify our theory.



      In the example you gave, Newton had some measurements (like falling apples) that he wanted to explain, so he came up with his theory of force, acceleration and movement, and he could explain his measurements. We continued testing his theory until finally the Michelson-Morley Experiment produced numbers that could not be explained with Newtonian Physics anymore. So, Einstein came up with a new theory that could explain all that the old theory could explain, and which also explained the result of the Michelson-Morley Experiment.



      Note that I said "could explain all that the old theory could explain". Newton's theory worked fine for small numbers, and Einstein's theory had to make the same predictions for these small numbers. More precisely, Newton's theory is nothing more or less than a convenient approximation of Einstein's theory for small numbers.



      We do this a lot in physics: We know that some stuff obeys some complex rules, but we don't want to bother with deriving mathematically correct results, so we just use an approximation (and hopefully check that this approximation is indeed not too far off). The point is, in the end physicists can only falsify stuff by measurement which includes measurement errors, and it does not help our cause to calculate stuff we can't measure. But the approximations allow us to make conclusions we cannot derive with mathematical rigor.



      So, a physicist with a quartz-clock, a ruler, and a scale will simply use Newtonian Mechanics to predict their measurements. A physicist listening in to gravitational waves does not have this luxury, they must use General Relativity to derive their predictions. The first physicist simply uses an approximation (Newtonian Mechanics) to an approximation (Special Relativity) to a theory (General Relativity) which we do not know what theory it approximates yet (String Theory? Loop Quantum Gravity? Something else?)



      In this sense, no physical theory is fully correct or incorrect. For some theories we know where they start producing numbers that actually disagree with our experiments, and for others we may not have discovered those places yet. But that does not reduce their usefulness when we apply them to problems where we know that they yield sufficiently precise results. In the end, any physical theory is just an approximation of reality.






      share|improve this answer










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      cmaster is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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      • 3





        I'm not sure if the statement "any physical theory is just an approximation of reality" is necessarily always true. After all, we could inadvertently stumble upon a physical theory that exactly describes reality; there's nothing preventing us from doing that. However, we couldn't ever verify that it exactly described reality, as it can only ever be verified to within a finite experimental uncertainty. Other than that admittedly quite pedantic clarification, great answer!

        – probably_someone
        yesterday













      • @probably_someone No, it's not physics then - the recipe that "exactly describes reality" is a beast that would be incompatible with the existing processes/customs of physics and very much compatible with those of mathematics. So it would be basically mathematics for all intents and purposes and we would dismantle all the LHCs and JWSTs of this world. (Such recipe is simply a set of axioms and all the further work is exploring the implications in this or that scenario.)

        – kubanczyk
        16 hours ago








      • 1





        @cmaster When you say "then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements" it isn't very easy to understand, I prefer to put it in other words: some fancy theory that predicts other future measurements.

        – kubanczyk
        16 hours ago











      • @probably_someone Full ACK on that nitpick :-) I left that bit out because I didn't want to unnecessarily complicate the answer. Since we cannot know the difference between an approximating theory and that lucky find of the true theory, I don't think it makes a difference not to mention it in the answer. But I do hope that curious readers read your comment.

        – cmaster
        15 hours ago











      • @kubanczyk I formulated it this way because the theorist whipping up a new theory only ever knows the past measurements, and can only weave the theory in a way that makes it fit those past measurements. Of course, they hope that their theory will indeed make correct predictions, but the deriving of measurable predictions really only comes after the theory has been formulated, and success of the predictions is not guaranteed. Of course, there is also the observation that a theory that does not make falsifiable predictions is rather worthless, yet it would still be a theory for what we know.

        – cmaster
        15 hours ago
















      29














      In math, we define stuff like numbers and operators, then we go on to prove other stuff from those premises.



      When you ask: "Is 1 + 1 = 0?", a mathematician will just ask back: "With what definition of +?"




      • If you assume natural numbers and the common definition of +, then this statement is false.


      • If you assume numbers modulo 2 and + meaning XOR, then this statement is perfectly true.



      You cannot say that we falsified the claim that 1 + 1 = 2; we just came up with new definitions for what + could mean.





      For physics, the situation is a little different: Here we measure stuff we want to explain, then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements, and finally, we test the theory by measuring more stuff, trying to falsify our theory.



      In the example you gave, Newton had some measurements (like falling apples) that he wanted to explain, so he came up with his theory of force, acceleration and movement, and he could explain his measurements. We continued testing his theory until finally the Michelson-Morley Experiment produced numbers that could not be explained with Newtonian Physics anymore. So, Einstein came up with a new theory that could explain all that the old theory could explain, and which also explained the result of the Michelson-Morley Experiment.



      Note that I said "could explain all that the old theory could explain". Newton's theory worked fine for small numbers, and Einstein's theory had to make the same predictions for these small numbers. More precisely, Newton's theory is nothing more or less than a convenient approximation of Einstein's theory for small numbers.



      We do this a lot in physics: We know that some stuff obeys some complex rules, but we don't want to bother with deriving mathematically correct results, so we just use an approximation (and hopefully check that this approximation is indeed not too far off). The point is, in the end physicists can only falsify stuff by measurement which includes measurement errors, and it does not help our cause to calculate stuff we can't measure. But the approximations allow us to make conclusions we cannot derive with mathematical rigor.



      So, a physicist with a quartz-clock, a ruler, and a scale will simply use Newtonian Mechanics to predict their measurements. A physicist listening in to gravitational waves does not have this luxury, they must use General Relativity to derive their predictions. The first physicist simply uses an approximation (Newtonian Mechanics) to an approximation (Special Relativity) to a theory (General Relativity) which we do not know what theory it approximates yet (String Theory? Loop Quantum Gravity? Something else?)



      In this sense, no physical theory is fully correct or incorrect. For some theories we know where they start producing numbers that actually disagree with our experiments, and for others we may not have discovered those places yet. But that does not reduce their usefulness when we apply them to problems where we know that they yield sufficiently precise results. In the end, any physical theory is just an approximation of reality.






      share|improve this answer










      New contributor




      cmaster is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.
















      • 3





        I'm not sure if the statement "any physical theory is just an approximation of reality" is necessarily always true. After all, we could inadvertently stumble upon a physical theory that exactly describes reality; there's nothing preventing us from doing that. However, we couldn't ever verify that it exactly described reality, as it can only ever be verified to within a finite experimental uncertainty. Other than that admittedly quite pedantic clarification, great answer!

        – probably_someone
        yesterday













      • @probably_someone No, it's not physics then - the recipe that "exactly describes reality" is a beast that would be incompatible with the existing processes/customs of physics and very much compatible with those of mathematics. So it would be basically mathematics for all intents and purposes and we would dismantle all the LHCs and JWSTs of this world. (Such recipe is simply a set of axioms and all the further work is exploring the implications in this or that scenario.)

        – kubanczyk
        16 hours ago








      • 1





        @cmaster When you say "then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements" it isn't very easy to understand, I prefer to put it in other words: some fancy theory that predicts other future measurements.

        – kubanczyk
        16 hours ago











      • @probably_someone Full ACK on that nitpick :-) I left that bit out because I didn't want to unnecessarily complicate the answer. Since we cannot know the difference between an approximating theory and that lucky find of the true theory, I don't think it makes a difference not to mention it in the answer. But I do hope that curious readers read your comment.

        – cmaster
        15 hours ago











      • @kubanczyk I formulated it this way because the theorist whipping up a new theory only ever knows the past measurements, and can only weave the theory in a way that makes it fit those past measurements. Of course, they hope that their theory will indeed make correct predictions, but the deriving of measurable predictions really only comes after the theory has been formulated, and success of the predictions is not guaranteed. Of course, there is also the observation that a theory that does not make falsifiable predictions is rather worthless, yet it would still be a theory for what we know.

        – cmaster
        15 hours ago














      29












      29








      29







      In math, we define stuff like numbers and operators, then we go on to prove other stuff from those premises.



      When you ask: "Is 1 + 1 = 0?", a mathematician will just ask back: "With what definition of +?"




      • If you assume natural numbers and the common definition of +, then this statement is false.


      • If you assume numbers modulo 2 and + meaning XOR, then this statement is perfectly true.



      You cannot say that we falsified the claim that 1 + 1 = 2; we just came up with new definitions for what + could mean.





      For physics, the situation is a little different: Here we measure stuff we want to explain, then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements, and finally, we test the theory by measuring more stuff, trying to falsify our theory.



      In the example you gave, Newton had some measurements (like falling apples) that he wanted to explain, so he came up with his theory of force, acceleration and movement, and he could explain his measurements. We continued testing his theory until finally the Michelson-Morley Experiment produced numbers that could not be explained with Newtonian Physics anymore. So, Einstein came up with a new theory that could explain all that the old theory could explain, and which also explained the result of the Michelson-Morley Experiment.



      Note that I said "could explain all that the old theory could explain". Newton's theory worked fine for small numbers, and Einstein's theory had to make the same predictions for these small numbers. More precisely, Newton's theory is nothing more or less than a convenient approximation of Einstein's theory for small numbers.



      We do this a lot in physics: We know that some stuff obeys some complex rules, but we don't want to bother with deriving mathematically correct results, so we just use an approximation (and hopefully check that this approximation is indeed not too far off). The point is, in the end physicists can only falsify stuff by measurement which includes measurement errors, and it does not help our cause to calculate stuff we can't measure. But the approximations allow us to make conclusions we cannot derive with mathematical rigor.



      So, a physicist with a quartz-clock, a ruler, and a scale will simply use Newtonian Mechanics to predict their measurements. A physicist listening in to gravitational waves does not have this luxury, they must use General Relativity to derive their predictions. The first physicist simply uses an approximation (Newtonian Mechanics) to an approximation (Special Relativity) to a theory (General Relativity) which we do not know what theory it approximates yet (String Theory? Loop Quantum Gravity? Something else?)



      In this sense, no physical theory is fully correct or incorrect. For some theories we know where they start producing numbers that actually disagree with our experiments, and for others we may not have discovered those places yet. But that does not reduce their usefulness when we apply them to problems where we know that they yield sufficiently precise results. In the end, any physical theory is just an approximation of reality.






      share|improve this answer










      New contributor




      cmaster is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.










      In math, we define stuff like numbers and operators, then we go on to prove other stuff from those premises.



      When you ask: "Is 1 + 1 = 0?", a mathematician will just ask back: "With what definition of +?"




      • If you assume natural numbers and the common definition of +, then this statement is false.


      • If you assume numbers modulo 2 and + meaning XOR, then this statement is perfectly true.



      You cannot say that we falsified the claim that 1 + 1 = 2; we just came up with new definitions for what + could mean.





      For physics, the situation is a little different: Here we measure stuff we want to explain, then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements, and finally, we test the theory by measuring more stuff, trying to falsify our theory.



      In the example you gave, Newton had some measurements (like falling apples) that he wanted to explain, so he came up with his theory of force, acceleration and movement, and he could explain his measurements. We continued testing his theory until finally the Michelson-Morley Experiment produced numbers that could not be explained with Newtonian Physics anymore. So, Einstein came up with a new theory that could explain all that the old theory could explain, and which also explained the result of the Michelson-Morley Experiment.



      Note that I said "could explain all that the old theory could explain". Newton's theory worked fine for small numbers, and Einstein's theory had to make the same predictions for these small numbers. More precisely, Newton's theory is nothing more or less than a convenient approximation of Einstein's theory for small numbers.



      We do this a lot in physics: We know that some stuff obeys some complex rules, but we don't want to bother with deriving mathematically correct results, so we just use an approximation (and hopefully check that this approximation is indeed not too far off). The point is, in the end physicists can only falsify stuff by measurement which includes measurement errors, and it does not help our cause to calculate stuff we can't measure. But the approximations allow us to make conclusions we cannot derive with mathematical rigor.



      So, a physicist with a quartz-clock, a ruler, and a scale will simply use Newtonian Mechanics to predict their measurements. A physicist listening in to gravitational waves does not have this luxury, they must use General Relativity to derive their predictions. The first physicist simply uses an approximation (Newtonian Mechanics) to an approximation (Special Relativity) to a theory (General Relativity) which we do not know what theory it approximates yet (String Theory? Loop Quantum Gravity? Something else?)



      In this sense, no physical theory is fully correct or incorrect. For some theories we know where they start producing numbers that actually disagree with our experiments, and for others we may not have discovered those places yet. But that does not reduce their usefulness when we apply them to problems where we know that they yield sufficiently precise results. In the end, any physical theory is just an approximation of reality.







      share|improve this answer










      New contributor




      cmaster is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.









      share|improve this answer



      share|improve this answer








      edited 15 hours ago





















      New contributor




      cmaster is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.









      answered yesterday









      cmastercmaster

      33615




      33615




      New contributor




      cmaster is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.





      New contributor





      cmaster is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.






      cmaster is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.








      • 3





        I'm not sure if the statement "any physical theory is just an approximation of reality" is necessarily always true. After all, we could inadvertently stumble upon a physical theory that exactly describes reality; there's nothing preventing us from doing that. However, we couldn't ever verify that it exactly described reality, as it can only ever be verified to within a finite experimental uncertainty. Other than that admittedly quite pedantic clarification, great answer!

        – probably_someone
        yesterday













      • @probably_someone No, it's not physics then - the recipe that "exactly describes reality" is a beast that would be incompatible with the existing processes/customs of physics and very much compatible with those of mathematics. So it would be basically mathematics for all intents and purposes and we would dismantle all the LHCs and JWSTs of this world. (Such recipe is simply a set of axioms and all the further work is exploring the implications in this or that scenario.)

        – kubanczyk
        16 hours ago








      • 1





        @cmaster When you say "then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements" it isn't very easy to understand, I prefer to put it in other words: some fancy theory that predicts other future measurements.

        – kubanczyk
        16 hours ago











      • @probably_someone Full ACK on that nitpick :-) I left that bit out because I didn't want to unnecessarily complicate the answer. Since we cannot know the difference between an approximating theory and that lucky find of the true theory, I don't think it makes a difference not to mention it in the answer. But I do hope that curious readers read your comment.

        – cmaster
        15 hours ago











      • @kubanczyk I formulated it this way because the theorist whipping up a new theory only ever knows the past measurements, and can only weave the theory in a way that makes it fit those past measurements. Of course, they hope that their theory will indeed make correct predictions, but the deriving of measurable predictions really only comes after the theory has been formulated, and success of the predictions is not guaranteed. Of course, there is also the observation that a theory that does not make falsifiable predictions is rather worthless, yet it would still be a theory for what we know.

        – cmaster
        15 hours ago














      • 3





        I'm not sure if the statement "any physical theory is just an approximation of reality" is necessarily always true. After all, we could inadvertently stumble upon a physical theory that exactly describes reality; there's nothing preventing us from doing that. However, we couldn't ever verify that it exactly described reality, as it can only ever be verified to within a finite experimental uncertainty. Other than that admittedly quite pedantic clarification, great answer!

        – probably_someone
        yesterday













      • @probably_someone No, it's not physics then - the recipe that "exactly describes reality" is a beast that would be incompatible with the existing processes/customs of physics and very much compatible with those of mathematics. So it would be basically mathematics for all intents and purposes and we would dismantle all the LHCs and JWSTs of this world. (Such recipe is simply a set of axioms and all the further work is exploring the implications in this or that scenario.)

        – kubanczyk
        16 hours ago








      • 1





        @cmaster When you say "then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements" it isn't very easy to understand, I prefer to put it in other words: some fancy theory that predicts other future measurements.

        – kubanczyk
        16 hours ago











      • @probably_someone Full ACK on that nitpick :-) I left that bit out because I didn't want to unnecessarily complicate the answer. Since we cannot know the difference between an approximating theory and that lucky find of the true theory, I don't think it makes a difference not to mention it in the answer. But I do hope that curious readers read your comment.

        – cmaster
        15 hours ago











      • @kubanczyk I formulated it this way because the theorist whipping up a new theory only ever knows the past measurements, and can only weave the theory in a way that makes it fit those past measurements. Of course, they hope that their theory will indeed make correct predictions, but the deriving of measurable predictions really only comes after the theory has been formulated, and success of the predictions is not guaranteed. Of course, there is also the observation that a theory that does not make falsifiable predictions is rather worthless, yet it would still be a theory for what we know.

        – cmaster
        15 hours ago








      3




      3





      I'm not sure if the statement "any physical theory is just an approximation of reality" is necessarily always true. After all, we could inadvertently stumble upon a physical theory that exactly describes reality; there's nothing preventing us from doing that. However, we couldn't ever verify that it exactly described reality, as it can only ever be verified to within a finite experimental uncertainty. Other than that admittedly quite pedantic clarification, great answer!

      – probably_someone
      yesterday







      I'm not sure if the statement "any physical theory is just an approximation of reality" is necessarily always true. After all, we could inadvertently stumble upon a physical theory that exactly describes reality; there's nothing preventing us from doing that. However, we couldn't ever verify that it exactly described reality, as it can only ever be verified to within a finite experimental uncertainty. Other than that admittedly quite pedantic clarification, great answer!

      – probably_someone
      yesterday















      @probably_someone No, it's not physics then - the recipe that "exactly describes reality" is a beast that would be incompatible with the existing processes/customs of physics and very much compatible with those of mathematics. So it would be basically mathematics for all intents and purposes and we would dismantle all the LHCs and JWSTs of this world. (Such recipe is simply a set of axioms and all the further work is exploring the implications in this or that scenario.)

      – kubanczyk
      16 hours ago







      @probably_someone No, it's not physics then - the recipe that "exactly describes reality" is a beast that would be incompatible with the existing processes/customs of physics and very much compatible with those of mathematics. So it would be basically mathematics for all intents and purposes and we would dismantle all the LHCs and JWSTs of this world. (Such recipe is simply a set of axioms and all the further work is exploring the implications in this or that scenario.)

      – kubanczyk
      16 hours ago






      1




      1





      @cmaster When you say "then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements" it isn't very easy to understand, I prefer to put it in other words: some fancy theory that predicts other future measurements.

      – kubanczyk
      16 hours ago





      @cmaster When you say "then we whip up some fancy theory to explain the measurements" it isn't very easy to understand, I prefer to put it in other words: some fancy theory that predicts other future measurements.

      – kubanczyk
      16 hours ago













      @probably_someone Full ACK on that nitpick :-) I left that bit out because I didn't want to unnecessarily complicate the answer. Since we cannot know the difference between an approximating theory and that lucky find of the true theory, I don't think it makes a difference not to mention it in the answer. But I do hope that curious readers read your comment.

      – cmaster
      15 hours ago





      @probably_someone Full ACK on that nitpick :-) I left that bit out because I didn't want to unnecessarily complicate the answer. Since we cannot know the difference between an approximating theory and that lucky find of the true theory, I don't think it makes a difference not to mention it in the answer. But I do hope that curious readers read your comment.

      – cmaster
      15 hours ago













      @kubanczyk I formulated it this way because the theorist whipping up a new theory only ever knows the past measurements, and can only weave the theory in a way that makes it fit those past measurements. Of course, they hope that their theory will indeed make correct predictions, but the deriving of measurable predictions really only comes after the theory has been formulated, and success of the predictions is not guaranteed. Of course, there is also the observation that a theory that does not make falsifiable predictions is rather worthless, yet it would still be a theory for what we know.

      – cmaster
      15 hours ago





      @kubanczyk I formulated it this way because the theorist whipping up a new theory only ever knows the past measurements, and can only weave the theory in a way that makes it fit those past measurements. Of course, they hope that their theory will indeed make correct predictions, but the deriving of measurable predictions really only comes after the theory has been formulated, and success of the predictions is not guaranteed. Of course, there is also the observation that a theory that does not make falsifiable predictions is rather worthless, yet it would still be a theory for what we know.

      – cmaster
      15 hours ago











      9














      The hypothesis 1+1=0 is false in the domain of natural numbers. If the domain is the finite field of the integers mod 2, then one is no longer in the domain of the natural numbers and the statement 1+1=0 would be true in that domain.



      The question is why do we not consider these to be falsifications of each other?



      These are not contradictions or falsifications if we view these statements in their separate domains. The domain of the natural numbers is not the domain of the integers mod 2. Although the statements may look the same, they are statements derived or not from different domains and so are different.





      Falsification would be involved in mathematics by assuming something with the intent to arrive at a contradiction. If one can arrive at the contradiction, then one can conclude that what one assumed true was false. One name for this inference rule would be proof by contradiction.



      Wikipedia describes it as follows:




      In logic, proof by contradiction is a form of proof that establishes the truth or validity of a proposition by first assuming that the opposite proposition is true, and then shows that such an assumption leads to a contradiction. Proof by contradiction is also known as indirect proof, proof by assuming the opposite, and reductio ad impossibile.






      Wikipedia contributors. (2019, March 26). Proof by contradiction. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 16:55, April 9, 2019, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Proof_by_contradiction&oldid=889548940






      share|improve this answer
























      • But then why is Newtonian mechanics viewed as being falsified? There too, it is correct in its own domain. Why should we view this as a falsification while in the 1+1=0 it is not?

        – K9Lucario
        yesterday






      • 4





        @K9Lucario Restricted to certain problems in the domain of bodies in motion, Newtonian mechanics is still useful for making predictions. Current gravity theories explain more of the data obtained from the same domain of bodies in motion. So these theories are talking about the same domain.

        – Frank Hubeny
        yesterday






      • 14





        I think you might want to stress a particular facet of your answer - 1+1=0 in the domain of the naturals vs F_2 is not the same statement. Sure, it looks the same when we write it in our convenient notation, but if you were to logically express both statements from the "ground up" you would find they are simply different.

        – TreFox
        yesterday






      • 1





        @TreFox I agree. They are not the same statements because the domains are different. They look the same, because sometimes our conventions for symbolizing natural numbers and equivalence classes look the same. However, we could use a different notation for each domain to emphasize their differences.

        – Frank Hubeny
        yesterday






      • 2





        @K9Lucario the domain of science is the real world. In math, we may choose the axiom set arbitrarily. We don't have such luxury in real life.

        – IMil
        23 hours ago
















      9














      The hypothesis 1+1=0 is false in the domain of natural numbers. If the domain is the finite field of the integers mod 2, then one is no longer in the domain of the natural numbers and the statement 1+1=0 would be true in that domain.



      The question is why do we not consider these to be falsifications of each other?



      These are not contradictions or falsifications if we view these statements in their separate domains. The domain of the natural numbers is not the domain of the integers mod 2. Although the statements may look the same, they are statements derived or not from different domains and so are different.





      Falsification would be involved in mathematics by assuming something with the intent to arrive at a contradiction. If one can arrive at the contradiction, then one can conclude that what one assumed true was false. One name for this inference rule would be proof by contradiction.



      Wikipedia describes it as follows:




      In logic, proof by contradiction is a form of proof that establishes the truth or validity of a proposition by first assuming that the opposite proposition is true, and then shows that such an assumption leads to a contradiction. Proof by contradiction is also known as indirect proof, proof by assuming the opposite, and reductio ad impossibile.






      Wikipedia contributors. (2019, March 26). Proof by contradiction. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 16:55, April 9, 2019, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Proof_by_contradiction&oldid=889548940






      share|improve this answer
























      • But then why is Newtonian mechanics viewed as being falsified? There too, it is correct in its own domain. Why should we view this as a falsification while in the 1+1=0 it is not?

        – K9Lucario
        yesterday






      • 4





        @K9Lucario Restricted to certain problems in the domain of bodies in motion, Newtonian mechanics is still useful for making predictions. Current gravity theories explain more of the data obtained from the same domain of bodies in motion. So these theories are talking about the same domain.

        – Frank Hubeny
        yesterday






      • 14





        I think you might want to stress a particular facet of your answer - 1+1=0 in the domain of the naturals vs F_2 is not the same statement. Sure, it looks the same when we write it in our convenient notation, but if you were to logically express both statements from the "ground up" you would find they are simply different.

        – TreFox
        yesterday






      • 1





        @TreFox I agree. They are not the same statements because the domains are different. They look the same, because sometimes our conventions for symbolizing natural numbers and equivalence classes look the same. However, we could use a different notation for each domain to emphasize their differences.

        – Frank Hubeny
        yesterday






      • 2





        @K9Lucario the domain of science is the real world. In math, we may choose the axiom set arbitrarily. We don't have such luxury in real life.

        – IMil
        23 hours ago














      9












      9








      9







      The hypothesis 1+1=0 is false in the domain of natural numbers. If the domain is the finite field of the integers mod 2, then one is no longer in the domain of the natural numbers and the statement 1+1=0 would be true in that domain.



      The question is why do we not consider these to be falsifications of each other?



      These are not contradictions or falsifications if we view these statements in their separate domains. The domain of the natural numbers is not the domain of the integers mod 2. Although the statements may look the same, they are statements derived or not from different domains and so are different.





      Falsification would be involved in mathematics by assuming something with the intent to arrive at a contradiction. If one can arrive at the contradiction, then one can conclude that what one assumed true was false. One name for this inference rule would be proof by contradiction.



      Wikipedia describes it as follows:




      In logic, proof by contradiction is a form of proof that establishes the truth or validity of a proposition by first assuming that the opposite proposition is true, and then shows that such an assumption leads to a contradiction. Proof by contradiction is also known as indirect proof, proof by assuming the opposite, and reductio ad impossibile.






      Wikipedia contributors. (2019, March 26). Proof by contradiction. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 16:55, April 9, 2019, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Proof_by_contradiction&oldid=889548940






      share|improve this answer













      The hypothesis 1+1=0 is false in the domain of natural numbers. If the domain is the finite field of the integers mod 2, then one is no longer in the domain of the natural numbers and the statement 1+1=0 would be true in that domain.



      The question is why do we not consider these to be falsifications of each other?



      These are not contradictions or falsifications if we view these statements in their separate domains. The domain of the natural numbers is not the domain of the integers mod 2. Although the statements may look the same, they are statements derived or not from different domains and so are different.





      Falsification would be involved in mathematics by assuming something with the intent to arrive at a contradiction. If one can arrive at the contradiction, then one can conclude that what one assumed true was false. One name for this inference rule would be proof by contradiction.



      Wikipedia describes it as follows:




      In logic, proof by contradiction is a form of proof that establishes the truth or validity of a proposition by first assuming that the opposite proposition is true, and then shows that such an assumption leads to a contradiction. Proof by contradiction is also known as indirect proof, proof by assuming the opposite, and reductio ad impossibile.






      Wikipedia contributors. (2019, March 26). Proof by contradiction. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 16:55, April 9, 2019, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Proof_by_contradiction&oldid=889548940







      share|improve this answer












      share|improve this answer



      share|improve this answer










      answered yesterday









      Frank HubenyFrank Hubeny

      10.2k51556




      10.2k51556













      • But then why is Newtonian mechanics viewed as being falsified? There too, it is correct in its own domain. Why should we view this as a falsification while in the 1+1=0 it is not?

        – K9Lucario
        yesterday






      • 4





        @K9Lucario Restricted to certain problems in the domain of bodies in motion, Newtonian mechanics is still useful for making predictions. Current gravity theories explain more of the data obtained from the same domain of bodies in motion. So these theories are talking about the same domain.

        – Frank Hubeny
        yesterday






      • 14





        I think you might want to stress a particular facet of your answer - 1+1=0 in the domain of the naturals vs F_2 is not the same statement. Sure, it looks the same when we write it in our convenient notation, but if you were to logically express both statements from the "ground up" you would find they are simply different.

        – TreFox
        yesterday






      • 1





        @TreFox I agree. They are not the same statements because the domains are different. They look the same, because sometimes our conventions for symbolizing natural numbers and equivalence classes look the same. However, we could use a different notation for each domain to emphasize their differences.

        – Frank Hubeny
        yesterday






      • 2





        @K9Lucario the domain of science is the real world. In math, we may choose the axiom set arbitrarily. We don't have such luxury in real life.

        – IMil
        23 hours ago



















      • But then why is Newtonian mechanics viewed as being falsified? There too, it is correct in its own domain. Why should we view this as a falsification while in the 1+1=0 it is not?

        – K9Lucario
        yesterday






      • 4





        @K9Lucario Restricted to certain problems in the domain of bodies in motion, Newtonian mechanics is still useful for making predictions. Current gravity theories explain more of the data obtained from the same domain of bodies in motion. So these theories are talking about the same domain.

        – Frank Hubeny
        yesterday






      • 14





        I think you might want to stress a particular facet of your answer - 1+1=0 in the domain of the naturals vs F_2 is not the same statement. Sure, it looks the same when we write it in our convenient notation, but if you were to logically express both statements from the "ground up" you would find they are simply different.

        – TreFox
        yesterday






      • 1





        @TreFox I agree. They are not the same statements because the domains are different. They look the same, because sometimes our conventions for symbolizing natural numbers and equivalence classes look the same. However, we could use a different notation for each domain to emphasize their differences.

        – Frank Hubeny
        yesterday






      • 2





        @K9Lucario the domain of science is the real world. In math, we may choose the axiom set arbitrarily. We don't have such luxury in real life.

        – IMil
        23 hours ago

















      But then why is Newtonian mechanics viewed as being falsified? There too, it is correct in its own domain. Why should we view this as a falsification while in the 1+1=0 it is not?

      – K9Lucario
      yesterday





      But then why is Newtonian mechanics viewed as being falsified? There too, it is correct in its own domain. Why should we view this as a falsification while in the 1+1=0 it is not?

      – K9Lucario
      yesterday




      4




      4





      @K9Lucario Restricted to certain problems in the domain of bodies in motion, Newtonian mechanics is still useful for making predictions. Current gravity theories explain more of the data obtained from the same domain of bodies in motion. So these theories are talking about the same domain.

      – Frank Hubeny
      yesterday





      @K9Lucario Restricted to certain problems in the domain of bodies in motion, Newtonian mechanics is still useful for making predictions. Current gravity theories explain more of the data obtained from the same domain of bodies in motion. So these theories are talking about the same domain.

      – Frank Hubeny
      yesterday




      14




      14





      I think you might want to stress a particular facet of your answer - 1+1=0 in the domain of the naturals vs F_2 is not the same statement. Sure, it looks the same when we write it in our convenient notation, but if you were to logically express both statements from the "ground up" you would find they are simply different.

      – TreFox
      yesterday





      I think you might want to stress a particular facet of your answer - 1+1=0 in the domain of the naturals vs F_2 is not the same statement. Sure, it looks the same when we write it in our convenient notation, but if you were to logically express both statements from the "ground up" you would find they are simply different.

      – TreFox
      yesterday




      1




      1





      @TreFox I agree. They are not the same statements because the domains are different. They look the same, because sometimes our conventions for symbolizing natural numbers and equivalence classes look the same. However, we could use a different notation for each domain to emphasize their differences.

      – Frank Hubeny
      yesterday





      @TreFox I agree. They are not the same statements because the domains are different. They look the same, because sometimes our conventions for symbolizing natural numbers and equivalence classes look the same. However, we could use a different notation for each domain to emphasize their differences.

      – Frank Hubeny
      yesterday




      2




      2





      @K9Lucario the domain of science is the real world. In math, we may choose the axiom set arbitrarily. We don't have such luxury in real life.

      – IMil
      23 hours ago





      @K9Lucario the domain of science is the real world. In math, we may choose the axiom set arbitrarily. We don't have such luxury in real life.

      – IMil
      23 hours ago











      4














      1 + 1 = 0 is false.



      Meanwhile, (1_2) +_2 (1_2) = 0_2 is true. Here +_2 is a different operation than +, and 1_2 and 0_2 are different things than 1 and 0. So it's not surprising that one equation is true while the other is false.



      The problem is that we do not like to write "_2" everywhere, so we often write 1 + 1 = 0 when we mean 1_2 +_2 1_2 = 0_2. This can possibly lead to confusion, though hopefully the author (or context) will make it clear what is meant by the equation 1 + 1 = 0, whenever it is written, so that ambiguity is avoided.



      I would not say that Newtonian physics is "false", but I would say that it does not accurately predict certain observations we make about our universe, while Einstein's Relativity does seem to predict these observations quite well. So Newtonian physics is apparently not the best theory for our physical universe.



      However, since there are no other universes(?), physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience.






      share|improve this answer
























      • "physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience." Lol I love that diffidence! Some theorists believe that an infinite number of universes (a multiverse) exist, which don’t connect to each other. I find that quite amusing; how could that issue matter to me? Even a single universe (and a pluralistic metaphysics) is too much for anybody to understand very well – I don’t think that we have any business in other hypothetical ones!

        – Rortian
        yesterday













      • @Rortian : One model of multiverses makes them materially inaccessible, but gravitationally interacting. So while you can't touch anything in that other universe or see any light from things in that universe, you may still feel the force of gravity from things in that universe. A weak version of this is dark flow, peculiar galactic motion caused by masses which have moved beyond the horizon of the observable universe (see cosmological horizon).

        – Eric Towers
        16 hours ago













      • Well, @Eric Towers...theoretical physics is rather fascinating, but how relevant is it to people who aren't working at it? I don't mean that it doesn't inspire the production of engineering marvels like bombs, computer chips and spacecraft, but it doesn't inspire me to think about the things that matter most to me and to the people I associate with...

        – Rortian
        4 hours ago








      • 1





        @Rortian : My comment was a reply to your "how could that issue matter to me?" Your comment seems based on the (not necessarily true) belief that these other universes have no mechanism of action on you. I pointed out two theories of inaccessible alternate universes that do act on you.

        – Eric Towers
        3 hours ago
















      4














      1 + 1 = 0 is false.



      Meanwhile, (1_2) +_2 (1_2) = 0_2 is true. Here +_2 is a different operation than +, and 1_2 and 0_2 are different things than 1 and 0. So it's not surprising that one equation is true while the other is false.



      The problem is that we do not like to write "_2" everywhere, so we often write 1 + 1 = 0 when we mean 1_2 +_2 1_2 = 0_2. This can possibly lead to confusion, though hopefully the author (or context) will make it clear what is meant by the equation 1 + 1 = 0, whenever it is written, so that ambiguity is avoided.



      I would not say that Newtonian physics is "false", but I would say that it does not accurately predict certain observations we make about our universe, while Einstein's Relativity does seem to predict these observations quite well. So Newtonian physics is apparently not the best theory for our physical universe.



      However, since there are no other universes(?), physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience.






      share|improve this answer
























      • "physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience." Lol I love that diffidence! Some theorists believe that an infinite number of universes (a multiverse) exist, which don’t connect to each other. I find that quite amusing; how could that issue matter to me? Even a single universe (and a pluralistic metaphysics) is too much for anybody to understand very well – I don’t think that we have any business in other hypothetical ones!

        – Rortian
        yesterday













      • @Rortian : One model of multiverses makes them materially inaccessible, but gravitationally interacting. So while you can't touch anything in that other universe or see any light from things in that universe, you may still feel the force of gravity from things in that universe. A weak version of this is dark flow, peculiar galactic motion caused by masses which have moved beyond the horizon of the observable universe (see cosmological horizon).

        – Eric Towers
        16 hours ago













      • Well, @Eric Towers...theoretical physics is rather fascinating, but how relevant is it to people who aren't working at it? I don't mean that it doesn't inspire the production of engineering marvels like bombs, computer chips and spacecraft, but it doesn't inspire me to think about the things that matter most to me and to the people I associate with...

        – Rortian
        4 hours ago








      • 1





        @Rortian : My comment was a reply to your "how could that issue matter to me?" Your comment seems based on the (not necessarily true) belief that these other universes have no mechanism of action on you. I pointed out two theories of inaccessible alternate universes that do act on you.

        – Eric Towers
        3 hours ago














      4












      4








      4







      1 + 1 = 0 is false.



      Meanwhile, (1_2) +_2 (1_2) = 0_2 is true. Here +_2 is a different operation than +, and 1_2 and 0_2 are different things than 1 and 0. So it's not surprising that one equation is true while the other is false.



      The problem is that we do not like to write "_2" everywhere, so we often write 1 + 1 = 0 when we mean 1_2 +_2 1_2 = 0_2. This can possibly lead to confusion, though hopefully the author (or context) will make it clear what is meant by the equation 1 + 1 = 0, whenever it is written, so that ambiguity is avoided.



      I would not say that Newtonian physics is "false", but I would say that it does not accurately predict certain observations we make about our universe, while Einstein's Relativity does seem to predict these observations quite well. So Newtonian physics is apparently not the best theory for our physical universe.



      However, since there are no other universes(?), physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience.






      share|improve this answer













      1 + 1 = 0 is false.



      Meanwhile, (1_2) +_2 (1_2) = 0_2 is true. Here +_2 is a different operation than +, and 1_2 and 0_2 are different things than 1 and 0. So it's not surprising that one equation is true while the other is false.



      The problem is that we do not like to write "_2" everywhere, so we often write 1 + 1 = 0 when we mean 1_2 +_2 1_2 = 0_2. This can possibly lead to confusion, though hopefully the author (or context) will make it clear what is meant by the equation 1 + 1 = 0, whenever it is written, so that ambiguity is avoided.



      I would not say that Newtonian physics is "false", but I would say that it does not accurately predict certain observations we make about our universe, while Einstein's Relativity does seem to predict these observations quite well. So Newtonian physics is apparently not the best theory for our physical universe.



      However, since there are no other universes(?), physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience.







      share|improve this answer












      share|improve this answer



      share|improve this answer










      answered yesterday









      mathmandanmathmandan

      1813




      1813













      • "physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience." Lol I love that diffidence! Some theorists believe that an infinite number of universes (a multiverse) exist, which don’t connect to each other. I find that quite amusing; how could that issue matter to me? Even a single universe (and a pluralistic metaphysics) is too much for anybody to understand very well – I don’t think that we have any business in other hypothetical ones!

        – Rortian
        yesterday













      • @Rortian : One model of multiverses makes them materially inaccessible, but gravitationally interacting. So while you can't touch anything in that other universe or see any light from things in that universe, you may still feel the force of gravity from things in that universe. A weak version of this is dark flow, peculiar galactic motion caused by masses which have moved beyond the horizon of the observable universe (see cosmological horizon).

        – Eric Towers
        16 hours ago













      • Well, @Eric Towers...theoretical physics is rather fascinating, but how relevant is it to people who aren't working at it? I don't mean that it doesn't inspire the production of engineering marvels like bombs, computer chips and spacecraft, but it doesn't inspire me to think about the things that matter most to me and to the people I associate with...

        – Rortian
        4 hours ago








      • 1





        @Rortian : My comment was a reply to your "how could that issue matter to me?" Your comment seems based on the (not necessarily true) belief that these other universes have no mechanism of action on you. I pointed out two theories of inaccessible alternate universes that do act on you.

        – Eric Towers
        3 hours ago



















      • "physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience." Lol I love that diffidence! Some theorists believe that an infinite number of universes (a multiverse) exist, which don’t connect to each other. I find that quite amusing; how could that issue matter to me? Even a single universe (and a pluralistic metaphysics) is too much for anybody to understand very well – I don’t think that we have any business in other hypothetical ones!

        – Rortian
        yesterday













      • @Rortian : One model of multiverses makes them materially inaccessible, but gravitationally interacting. So while you can't touch anything in that other universe or see any light from things in that universe, you may still feel the force of gravity from things in that universe. A weak version of this is dark flow, peculiar galactic motion caused by masses which have moved beyond the horizon of the observable universe (see cosmological horizon).

        – Eric Towers
        16 hours ago













      • Well, @Eric Towers...theoretical physics is rather fascinating, but how relevant is it to people who aren't working at it? I don't mean that it doesn't inspire the production of engineering marvels like bombs, computer chips and spacecraft, but it doesn't inspire me to think about the things that matter most to me and to the people I associate with...

        – Rortian
        4 hours ago








      • 1





        @Rortian : My comment was a reply to your "how could that issue matter to me?" Your comment seems based on the (not necessarily true) belief that these other universes have no mechanism of action on you. I pointed out two theories of inaccessible alternate universes that do act on you.

        – Eric Towers
        3 hours ago

















      "physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience." Lol I love that diffidence! Some theorists believe that an infinite number of universes (a multiverse) exist, which don’t connect to each other. I find that quite amusing; how could that issue matter to me? Even a single universe (and a pluralistic metaphysics) is too much for anybody to understand very well – I don’t think that we have any business in other hypothetical ones!

      – Rortian
      yesterday







      "physicists frequently omit the phrase "for our physical universe" for convenience." Lol I love that diffidence! Some theorists believe that an infinite number of universes (a multiverse) exist, which don’t connect to each other. I find that quite amusing; how could that issue matter to me? Even a single universe (and a pluralistic metaphysics) is too much for anybody to understand very well – I don’t think that we have any business in other hypothetical ones!

      – Rortian
      yesterday















      @Rortian : One model of multiverses makes them materially inaccessible, but gravitationally interacting. So while you can't touch anything in that other universe or see any light from things in that universe, you may still feel the force of gravity from things in that universe. A weak version of this is dark flow, peculiar galactic motion caused by masses which have moved beyond the horizon of the observable universe (see cosmological horizon).

      – Eric Towers
      16 hours ago







      @Rortian : One model of multiverses makes them materially inaccessible, but gravitationally interacting. So while you can't touch anything in that other universe or see any light from things in that universe, you may still feel the force of gravity from things in that universe. A weak version of this is dark flow, peculiar galactic motion caused by masses which have moved beyond the horizon of the observable universe (see cosmological horizon).

      – Eric Towers
      16 hours ago















      Well, @Eric Towers...theoretical physics is rather fascinating, but how relevant is it to people who aren't working at it? I don't mean that it doesn't inspire the production of engineering marvels like bombs, computer chips and spacecraft, but it doesn't inspire me to think about the things that matter most to me and to the people I associate with...

      – Rortian
      4 hours ago







      Well, @Eric Towers...theoretical physics is rather fascinating, but how relevant is it to people who aren't working at it? I don't mean that it doesn't inspire the production of engineering marvels like bombs, computer chips and spacecraft, but it doesn't inspire me to think about the things that matter most to me and to the people I associate with...

      – Rortian
      4 hours ago






      1




      1





      @Rortian : My comment was a reply to your "how could that issue matter to me?" Your comment seems based on the (not necessarily true) belief that these other universes have no mechanism of action on you. I pointed out two theories of inaccessible alternate universes that do act on you.

      – Eric Towers
      3 hours ago





      @Rortian : My comment was a reply to your "how could that issue matter to me?" Your comment seems based on the (not necessarily true) belief that these other universes have no mechanism of action on you. I pointed out two theories of inaccessible alternate universes that do act on you.

      – Eric Towers
      3 hours ago











      2














      Your example from mathematics shows: To assess a mathematical statement one should first fix the context, the domain of validity of the symbols. Because in the context of natural numbers the statement 1+1=0 is false. While in the context of Z/2Z the statement is correct. Except the rare case of undecidable questions, in mathematics one can prove or disprove the correctness of a statement.



      In natural science, e.g. in physics, one can never prove a general statement. All „laws of nature“ have the status of hypotheses. One can confirm a hypothesis or one can disprove the hypothesis by a counter example. But one cannot prove it.



      IMO Newton’s laws are a good approximation in a broad domain, i.e. for small energy and medium dimension. One can deduce Newton’s laws as first order approximation from the field equations of General Relativity. But anyhow, Newton’s basic concepts like space, time and gravitation have quite a different meaning in Einstein’s theory of curved spacetime.



      To say that a statement turns out as a first approximation is a refined and better version than saying that the statement is false. I prefer the refined version :-)






      share|improve this answer






























        2














        Your example from mathematics shows: To assess a mathematical statement one should first fix the context, the domain of validity of the symbols. Because in the context of natural numbers the statement 1+1=0 is false. While in the context of Z/2Z the statement is correct. Except the rare case of undecidable questions, in mathematics one can prove or disprove the correctness of a statement.



        In natural science, e.g. in physics, one can never prove a general statement. All „laws of nature“ have the status of hypotheses. One can confirm a hypothesis or one can disprove the hypothesis by a counter example. But one cannot prove it.



        IMO Newton’s laws are a good approximation in a broad domain, i.e. for small energy and medium dimension. One can deduce Newton’s laws as first order approximation from the field equations of General Relativity. But anyhow, Newton’s basic concepts like space, time and gravitation have quite a different meaning in Einstein’s theory of curved spacetime.



        To say that a statement turns out as a first approximation is a refined and better version than saying that the statement is false. I prefer the refined version :-)






        share|improve this answer




























          2












          2








          2







          Your example from mathematics shows: To assess a mathematical statement one should first fix the context, the domain of validity of the symbols. Because in the context of natural numbers the statement 1+1=0 is false. While in the context of Z/2Z the statement is correct. Except the rare case of undecidable questions, in mathematics one can prove or disprove the correctness of a statement.



          In natural science, e.g. in physics, one can never prove a general statement. All „laws of nature“ have the status of hypotheses. One can confirm a hypothesis or one can disprove the hypothesis by a counter example. But one cannot prove it.



          IMO Newton’s laws are a good approximation in a broad domain, i.e. for small energy and medium dimension. One can deduce Newton’s laws as first order approximation from the field equations of General Relativity. But anyhow, Newton’s basic concepts like space, time and gravitation have quite a different meaning in Einstein’s theory of curved spacetime.



          To say that a statement turns out as a first approximation is a refined and better version than saying that the statement is false. I prefer the refined version :-)






          share|improve this answer















          Your example from mathematics shows: To assess a mathematical statement one should first fix the context, the domain of validity of the symbols. Because in the context of natural numbers the statement 1+1=0 is false. While in the context of Z/2Z the statement is correct. Except the rare case of undecidable questions, in mathematics one can prove or disprove the correctness of a statement.



          In natural science, e.g. in physics, one can never prove a general statement. All „laws of nature“ have the status of hypotheses. One can confirm a hypothesis or one can disprove the hypothesis by a counter example. But one cannot prove it.



          IMO Newton’s laws are a good approximation in a broad domain, i.e. for small energy and medium dimension. One can deduce Newton’s laws as first order approximation from the field equations of General Relativity. But anyhow, Newton’s basic concepts like space, time and gravitation have quite a different meaning in Einstein’s theory of curved spacetime.



          To say that a statement turns out as a first approximation is a refined and better version than saying that the statement is false. I prefer the refined version :-)







          share|improve this answer














          share|improve this answer



          share|improve this answer








          edited 6 hours ago

























          answered 9 hours ago









          Jo WehlerJo Wehler

          17.7k21864




          17.7k21864























              1














              Hmmm. What about 1 + 1 = 10 ?



              Is that equation, expressed in binary arithmetic, "false in the domain of natural numbers"?



              My grounding in math and logic isn't very strong, but I understand the Wikipedia entry...I just don't think that the notions of truth and falsity can coherently apply to inductive inferences (abstract descriptions of unobservable things).



              I've also heard people (philosophy professors!) say that Einstein disproved Newton's stuff, but that seems incorrect to me in the postmodern age of philosophy. Newton wasn't mistaken, his principles describe his observations very well. His theoretical model wasn't poor or wrong, and scientific proof seems to me to be an oxymoron. People who have faith in that idea reject the notion of fallibilism, which is commensurate with the postmodern approach:




              Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory,
              view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified
              in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the
              truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to
              science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved
              commonsense views.




              Stephen Hetherington, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy



              I've learned (is this correct?) that true/false distinctions are properties of formal languages ( arithmetic and logic), where axioms and operations are strictly defined and the symbols are unrelated to observable phenomena (only to each other).



              As for discourses in natural languages, the idea of epistemic truth (especially the theory of correspondence to reality) has been quite thoroughly discredited...or so I've been told...



              I'm new here; I wouldn't be happy to hear that I (and my wisest philosophy instructors) have misinterpreted Kant, Kuhn and Popper, but if a wise expert disagrees I'll listen. I believe that it's theoretically impossible to denote the absolute truth about unobservable phenomena or complex abstractions, but I'm still learning...



              In any case, to me coherency is the gold standard of human understanding, not truth. Subjective beliefs and public discourses may be assessed according to so-called objective criteria: the reliability of relevant evidence and the justification for one's presumptions. I think that that's one thing upon which scientists and philosophers might agree.






              share|improve this answer










              New contributor




              Rortian is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
              Check out our Code of Conduct.

























                1














                Hmmm. What about 1 + 1 = 10 ?



                Is that equation, expressed in binary arithmetic, "false in the domain of natural numbers"?



                My grounding in math and logic isn't very strong, but I understand the Wikipedia entry...I just don't think that the notions of truth and falsity can coherently apply to inductive inferences (abstract descriptions of unobservable things).



                I've also heard people (philosophy professors!) say that Einstein disproved Newton's stuff, but that seems incorrect to me in the postmodern age of philosophy. Newton wasn't mistaken, his principles describe his observations very well. His theoretical model wasn't poor or wrong, and scientific proof seems to me to be an oxymoron. People who have faith in that idea reject the notion of fallibilism, which is commensurate with the postmodern approach:




                Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory,
                view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified
                in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the
                truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to
                science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved
                commonsense views.




                Stephen Hetherington, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy



                I've learned (is this correct?) that true/false distinctions are properties of formal languages ( arithmetic and logic), where axioms and operations are strictly defined and the symbols are unrelated to observable phenomena (only to each other).



                As for discourses in natural languages, the idea of epistemic truth (especially the theory of correspondence to reality) has been quite thoroughly discredited...or so I've been told...



                I'm new here; I wouldn't be happy to hear that I (and my wisest philosophy instructors) have misinterpreted Kant, Kuhn and Popper, but if a wise expert disagrees I'll listen. I believe that it's theoretically impossible to denote the absolute truth about unobservable phenomena or complex abstractions, but I'm still learning...



                In any case, to me coherency is the gold standard of human understanding, not truth. Subjective beliefs and public discourses may be assessed according to so-called objective criteria: the reliability of relevant evidence and the justification for one's presumptions. I think that that's one thing upon which scientists and philosophers might agree.






                share|improve this answer










                New contributor




                Rortian is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
                Check out our Code of Conduct.























                  1












                  1








                  1







                  Hmmm. What about 1 + 1 = 10 ?



                  Is that equation, expressed in binary arithmetic, "false in the domain of natural numbers"?



                  My grounding in math and logic isn't very strong, but I understand the Wikipedia entry...I just don't think that the notions of truth and falsity can coherently apply to inductive inferences (abstract descriptions of unobservable things).



                  I've also heard people (philosophy professors!) say that Einstein disproved Newton's stuff, but that seems incorrect to me in the postmodern age of philosophy. Newton wasn't mistaken, his principles describe his observations very well. His theoretical model wasn't poor or wrong, and scientific proof seems to me to be an oxymoron. People who have faith in that idea reject the notion of fallibilism, which is commensurate with the postmodern approach:




                  Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory,
                  view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified
                  in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the
                  truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to
                  science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved
                  commonsense views.




                  Stephen Hetherington, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy



                  I've learned (is this correct?) that true/false distinctions are properties of formal languages ( arithmetic and logic), where axioms and operations are strictly defined and the symbols are unrelated to observable phenomena (only to each other).



                  As for discourses in natural languages, the idea of epistemic truth (especially the theory of correspondence to reality) has been quite thoroughly discredited...or so I've been told...



                  I'm new here; I wouldn't be happy to hear that I (and my wisest philosophy instructors) have misinterpreted Kant, Kuhn and Popper, but if a wise expert disagrees I'll listen. I believe that it's theoretically impossible to denote the absolute truth about unobservable phenomena or complex abstractions, but I'm still learning...



                  In any case, to me coherency is the gold standard of human understanding, not truth. Subjective beliefs and public discourses may be assessed according to so-called objective criteria: the reliability of relevant evidence and the justification for one's presumptions. I think that that's one thing upon which scientists and philosophers might agree.






                  share|improve this answer










                  New contributor




                  Rortian is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
                  Check out our Code of Conduct.










                  Hmmm. What about 1 + 1 = 10 ?



                  Is that equation, expressed in binary arithmetic, "false in the domain of natural numbers"?



                  My grounding in math and logic isn't very strong, but I understand the Wikipedia entry...I just don't think that the notions of truth and falsity can coherently apply to inductive inferences (abstract descriptions of unobservable things).



                  I've also heard people (philosophy professors!) say that Einstein disproved Newton's stuff, but that seems incorrect to me in the postmodern age of philosophy. Newton wasn't mistaken, his principles describe his observations very well. His theoretical model wasn't poor or wrong, and scientific proof seems to me to be an oxymoron. People who have faith in that idea reject the notion of fallibilism, which is commensurate with the postmodern approach:




                  Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory,
                  view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified
                  in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the
                  truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to
                  science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved
                  commonsense views.




                  Stephen Hetherington, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy



                  I've learned (is this correct?) that true/false distinctions are properties of formal languages ( arithmetic and logic), where axioms and operations are strictly defined and the symbols are unrelated to observable phenomena (only to each other).



                  As for discourses in natural languages, the idea of epistemic truth (especially the theory of correspondence to reality) has been quite thoroughly discredited...or so I've been told...



                  I'm new here; I wouldn't be happy to hear that I (and my wisest philosophy instructors) have misinterpreted Kant, Kuhn and Popper, but if a wise expert disagrees I'll listen. I believe that it's theoretically impossible to denote the absolute truth about unobservable phenomena or complex abstractions, but I'm still learning...



                  In any case, to me coherency is the gold standard of human understanding, not truth. Subjective beliefs and public discourses may be assessed according to so-called objective criteria: the reliability of relevant evidence and the justification for one's presumptions. I think that that's one thing upon which scientists and philosophers might agree.







                  share|improve this answer










                  New contributor




                  Rortian is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
                  Check out our Code of Conduct.









                  share|improve this answer



                  share|improve this answer








                  edited 4 hours ago





















                  New contributor




                  Rortian is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
                  Check out our Code of Conduct.









                  answered yesterday









                  RortianRortian

                  637




                  637




                  New contributor




                  Rortian is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
                  Check out our Code of Conduct.





                  New contributor





                  Rortian is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
                  Check out our Code of Conduct.






                  Rortian is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
                  Check out our Code of Conduct.






























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